eroded considerably over the past quarter century. Proprietary claims have increasingly moved upstream, from the end products them selves to the ground-breaking discoveries that made them possible in the first place. One im portant reason for this change has been a nar rowing of the gap between fundamental re search and commercial applications. Once largely a matter of serendipity or trial and error, drug discovery now depends critically on basic knowledge of genes, proteins and associated biochemical pathways. In addition, the practical payoffs of basic research have become easy to anticipate in many cases, making it straightfor ward to obtain patents for discoveries that in an earlier era would have seemed too far removed from useful application to warrant the effort. This shift in patenting activity has met little resistance. For example, in 1980 the U.S. Supreme Court held that genetically engi neered microorganisms were eligible for patent protection. Shortly thereafter, Congress created a specialized court to hear appeals in patent matters, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which has further extended the Supreme Court's expansive approach to patent eligibility. The Federal Circuit has also relaxed the standards normally required for patent protection, such as proof of the practical utility of an invention and of its lack of obviousness? standards that might otherwise have prevent ed the patenting of incremental advances in biomedicai research.
These changes in the economics of research and in the interpretation of the patent laws have been important factors in the proliferation of intellectual property claims for discoveries of a fundamental nature. But perhaps even more significant has been the explicit U.S. poli cy of allowing grantees to seek patent rights for the results of government-sponsored research.
This policy, which began in 1980 with passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, has turned universities into major players in the biotech business.
The Bayh-Dole Act was intended to pro mote the widespread use of federally funded inventions. The sponsors of the legislation be lieved that permitting grantees to obtain patent rights and to convey exclusive licenses for their inventions to private corporations would motivate investors to pick up where the government left off. This process, it was hoped, would produce commercial products from discoveries that might otherwise lan guish in the halls of academe. This goal is, of course, quite noble. But the law draws no distinction between inventions that lead directly to commercial products and fundamental advances that enable further sci entific studies. Universities have taken the op portunity to file patent applications on discov eries like new DNA sequences, protein structures and disease pathways?results that are primarily valuable because they enable more investigation. Columbia University, for example, now holds a portfolio in which 50 percent of its licensed patents represent such research tools. And even when they do not seek patents, universities often try to preserve their expectations for profitable payoffs by im posing restrictions on the dissemination of ma terials and reagents that might generate com mercial value somewhere down the line.
This frenzy of proprietary claiming has coin cided with unprecedented levels of both public and private investment in biopharmaceutical research and development?and magnificent progress in health care. So for many people, it may be difficult to see that there is any prob lem. But in the long run the current system may, paradoxically, hinder rather than acceler ate biomedicai research. Here we explore how recommend corrective actions. Given these cumbersome procedures, it is perhaps not sur prising that NIH declarations of exceptional circumstances have been extremely rare. In deed, we are aware of only a single case. The Bayh-Dole Act also permits an agency to compel licensing of the patents that result from research it had previously funded. But an agency can do so only if it determines that the university (or its exclusive licensee) is not tak ing steps to achieve "practical application of the subject invention" or if such licensing is necessary "to alleviate public health or safety needs or requirements for public use specified by Federal regulations." Exercise of such rights is not subject to an overarching directive that the circumstances be "exceptional." None theless, the Bayh-Dole Act seriously restricts the value of this provision by deferring such actions pending elaborate administrative pro ceedings and exhaustion of court appeals. The administrative obstacles have proved suffi ciently high that NIH has never once exercised this option.
Out of Reach
Although the idea of private universities earn ing large sums of money from publicly spon sored research may be troubling enough for many the real problem with the Bayh-Dole Act is that it often puts such academic research ad vances out of the reach. Although one might imagine that patent holders don't enforce their patents for noncommercial uses, some have in fact been quite aggressive in this regard, insist ing that university investigators sign license agreements, especially when they seek to transfer materials covered by a patent rather than simply practicing a patented technique inconspicuously in their own labs. Given that patent law offers no significant exemption from liability for experimental use and that the division between noncommercial and com mercial research can be blurry, it is indeed fool hardy for academic scientists to rely on the for bearance of patent holders.
Thus some patents can stall scientific progress. This concern is particularly acute for claims to early-stage discoveries that open up entirely new fields. Such patents may be quite broad, permitting their owners to control a wide range of subsequent research. One reply to this argument is that profit-seeking owners of pioneering patents will find it in their own best interest to disseminate their discoveries to as many follow-on improvers as possible. His tory shows otherwise. The Wright brothers, for example, refused to offer reasonable licensing terms for some of their aeronautical innova tions until compelled to do so by the govern ment. One notable recent example in the pharmaceutical industry is the controversy generated when DuPont imposed restrictions on academic investigators wishing to use its "oncomouse" technology, which DuPont con trols under an exclusive license from Harvard University, the patentee.
Why would a company not want to license its technology as widely as possible? Isn't that how it makes money? One reason is that issu ing such licenses requires considerable time and effort. Given the imperfect information available to the parties involved, the disparate assessments of value to the technology and the danger that one side might misappropriate the research plans of the other once they are dis closed in the course of negotiations, the trans action costs associated with such bargaining are likely to be quite high. And these costs mount quickly when the basic research discov eries necessary for subsequent work are owned not by just one company, but by a number of different entities.
Concern about an "anticommons" or "prop erty rights thicket" is quite pressing in contem porary biomedicai research, which often draws from many prior discoveries made by different scientists in universities and private compa nies. Exchanges of DNA sequences, laboratory animals, reagents and data that were once shared freely are today subject to licenses, ma terial-transfer and database-access agreements.
These arrangements have to be reviewed and negotiated before research may proceed.
A standard response to these fears is that market forces will motivate the emergence of patent pools and other institutions for bundling intellectual property rights. But this prediction
has not yet been borne out. Indeed, when rep resentatives of biopharmaceutical companies have seen the potential for an anticommons, they have reacted not by forming patent pools, but rather by strengthening the public domain.
The case of single nucleotide polymor phisms, or SNPs, provides an interesting exam ple of this phenomenon. Collections of SNPs are found throughout the genome and are a useful resource for scientists searching for genes involved in specific diseases. These SNPs also promise to be useful in developing diag nostic and therapeutic products. In recent years, various biotechnology companies have identified and sought patents on large numbers of SNPs, provoking concern on the part of both NIH and the pharmaceutical industry about the potential for balkanization of intellectual property rights to this important resource. Para doxically, the pharmaceutical industry has en joyed more latitude than NIH to respond to this threat by placing SNPs in the public domain. Figure 4 . Controversy surrounds the so-called "oncomouse," an animal that has been genetically engineered to be prone to cancer. The technology, patented by investiga tors at Harvard Medical School, is licensed to DuPont, which demands that all those using such animals?even academic investigators?sign license agreements. (Photo graph courtesy of Harvard Medical School.) Figure 5 . Single-nucleotide polymorphisms, or SNPs, are variations in genetic se quence found at an appreciable frequency (greater than 1 percent) in different indi viduals of the same species. This mapping shows the known distribution of SNPs on human chromosome 1, with the names of some indicated at the right. The variation in the DNA base sequence that constitutes SNP WIAF-2068 is shown at top, with G, C, A and representing, respectively, the bases guanine, cytosine, adenine and thymine. Biologists anticipate that an understanding of the genetic diversity now being quan tified in this way will have various biomedicai uses?for example, in determining an individual's susceptibility to certain heritable diseases. Both the National Institutes of Health and a consortium of private companies have been pushing to keep SNP data in the public domain, for fear that too many proprietary claims on this information will impede its use in medicine. (Data from the Whitehead Institute/MIT Center for Genome Research.)
Pharmaceutical companies have joined togeth er with the nonprofit Wellcome Trust (a U.K. based nongovernmental partner in the Human Genome Project, which is not bound by the Bayh-Dole Act) in a consortium to sponsor an SNP-identification effort with explicit instruc tions to put the information in the public do main. The SNP Consortium has candidly em braced a goal of defeating patent claims to SNPs. The willingness of private companies in a patent-sensitive industry to spend money to enhance the public domain is indeed curious.
We think it is powerful evidence of a perception in industry that claims to intellectual property rights for fundamental discoveries can create significant barriers to subsequent research and product development.
Possible Fixes
One solution might involve changing the patent laws to restrict patents on fundamental research. Congress or the courts might, for ex ample, reinvigorate the "products of nature" limitation on patent eligibility so as to exclude discoveries of DNA sequences, proteins and biochemical mech?nisms from patent protec tion. Lawmakers and judges could also fortify the utility standard to limit the patenting of re search tools. Another much-discussed idea is to provide an exemption from infringement li ability for research, particularly noncommer cial research. Although such legal adjustments are worth considering, it is difficult to calibrate these changes accurately, and the consequences of overdoing it could be grave.
Patents clearly matter to the biopharmaceuti cal industry, and undue restrictions on them may indeed deter private investment. Although it is possible that these companies?particularly those that make end products?would benefit in the long term from limits on certain patents, many of these businesses continue to insist that they need patents on their research to raise capital. Given that private investment in bio medical research and development today ex ceeds public funding, the strong belief of in vestors that patents are essential urges caution in changing the underlying legal rules.
When research is publicly sponsored, how ever, the argument for strong patent rights los es much of its force. The Bayh-Dole Act does not presume that patents are necessary to mo tivate grantees to perform research but rather that patents will promote subsequent utiliza tion and development of inventions. The rea soning that lurks behind this presumption is that patents and exclusive licenses are essential to attract the necessary private investment. Whatever the merits of this presumption for patents on final products such as new drugs, it makes little sense for patents on broadly en abling information and techniques that are ready for dissemination to scientists in both public and private institutions, advances that can be put to use in the laboratory right away, without any further investment.
A classic example is the Cohen-Boyer method for combining DNA from different or ganisms. Many observers attribute the rapid progress of the biotechnology industry to the fact that this technology was made widely available rather than licensed exclusively to a single company. Although this pre-Bayh-Dole technology was, in fact, patented, it was offered nonexclusively and cheaply to encourage com panies to purchase licenses rather than to chal lenge the patents. These nonexclusive licenses generated some $300 million for the universi ties that owned the patents, but it is difficult to see how they did anything to enhance product profitability or otherwise motivate subsequent research and development. If anything, the patent royalties imposed a modest tax on prod uct development.
A greater concern is that the Bayh-Dole Act does little to ensure that a university will li cense such patents nonexclusively. To the con trary, Congress was careful in the terms of the Bayh-Dole Act and subsequent legislation to give universities discretion to grant exclusive licenses, which may be more financially attrac tive than nonexclusive licensing. Exclusive li censes typically command higher royalties, and companies holding exclusive licenses are more willing to reimburse for patent costs and to provide additional grant funding to the in ventor. Indeed, the information available sug gests that the majority of university licenses to startups and small businesses are exclusive.
But it is not clear that such exclusive licens es are necessary to achieve the aims of the sent letters to some 50 other companies with products that work via the NF-pathway, demanding royalties on present or future product sales. Obviously, the companies that are now being asked to pay royalties did not need an exclusive license from Harvard, MIT and Whitehead to motivate them to pursue product development; the prospect of obtain ing patents on their own end products was sufficient. In this case, as in many others, pio neering patents issued to academic institu tions only thwart innovation. For many discoveries emerging from gov ernment-sponsored research, the benefits of patenting are low relative to its costs. But some discoveries, including some important research tools and enabling technologies generated in the course of publicly sponsored research, un doubtedly require substantial commercial in vestment to become reliably mass-produced for widespread distribution. For example, tech nologies and machines for DNA sequencing and analysis, initially developed in academic laboratories, required substantial follow-up in vestment by private companies to turn them into reliable and commercially available equip ment. Patents and exclusive licenses may be crucial to motivate this sort of investment.
The policy challenge, then, is to devise a sys tem that distinguishes cases in which propri etary claims make sense from cases in which they do not. The complexity of biomedicai re search makes this a formidable task, and the public interest in getting these determinations right demands assigning this responsibility to the most qualified body. Ideally, decisions about the dividing line between the public do main and private property should be made by institutions that are in a position to appreciate the tensions between widespread access and preservation of commercial incentives without being unduly swayed by motivations that di verge from the overall public interest.
Preserving the Commons So where should these decisions be made? On first examination, one might think that universi ties, which reap the rewards of the proprietary restrictions they impose on others but also pay the costs of restrictions that others impose on them, might be interested in maintaining at least some research in the public domain. The prob lem is that the costs to a university are largely borne by its scientists who cannot get prompt access to the proprietary technologies they seek, whereas the gains from licensing revenues are much more salient to its technology-transfer of ficers, who are charged with generating revenue. So corning to a consensus might be difficult.
Even when universities recognize that the larger academic community might be better off if they shared their research tools more freely, they face a serious problem: ensuring collec tive action. So long as other institutions are staking out claims, no university is likely to ab stain from asserting its own rights. Appeal to the traditions of open science may not be suffi cient, especially given that the scientists who hold those values don't usually make decisions regarding assertions of proprietary rights.
Left to their own devices, universities prob ably cannot mount the sustained community effort needed to preserve the research com mons. But, interestingly, on a number of occa sions NIH has been able to use sternly worded appeals to the norms of open science to con vince academic institutions to keep basic re search in the public domain. For example, in 1996 leaders of the National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI), together with the Wellcome Trust and academic researchers at the major human genome mapping centers, re solved that "all human genomic DNA se quence information, generated by centers funded for large-scale human sequencing, should be freely available and in the public do main in order to encourage research and de velopment and to maximize its benefit to soci ety." The NHGRI followed up with a policy statement making "rapid release of data into public databases" a condition for grants for 
Sound Footing
The time is ripe to fine-tune the Bayh-Dole Act to give funding agencies more latitude in guid ing the patenting and licensing activities of their grantees. We propose two modest re forms that would give these agencies, which have the proper combination of knowledge and incentives, somewhat greater discretion to determine when publicly funded discoveries should be put in the public domain. First, the circumstances in which an agency may prevent its contractor from retaining title to an invention should be liberalized. The cur rent language of the law creates a clear pre sumption that an agency should exercise this power very infrequently. That should be changed. Once the "exceptional circum stances" language is deleted, the law could be more freely applied to achieve the goal of pro moting widespread dissemination and use of research results. The process for review of "ex ceptional circumstance" determinations should be streamlined as well, with provisions for re search to proceed while examination of the de cision runs its course.
Second, Congress should modify the require ment that a funding agency's authority to com pel licensing of university patents be held in abeyance until all court appeals are exhausted. By the same token, however, an agency should not be given authority to act without some pro vision for judicial review. Unlike a determina tion to restrict patenting, a subsequent exercise of the right to compel licensing disturbs settled expectations. If business planning is too readily upset, industry could become wary of invest ing in university-based technology. It might be argued that restoring greater au thority to agencies would return us to the un happy position that motivated Congress to pass the Bayh-Dole Act in the first place. This danger appears quite small. In the intervening 23 years, NIH has embraced patenting and technology transfer in furtherance of its mis sion of improving public health. Moreover, our proposal to give agencies greater authority would not overturn the general presumption in favor of allowing government contractors to patent inventions. It would simply permit agencies to decide that patenting is not war ranted in particular cases, while streamlining procedures for making and reviewing these decisions. Giving greater discretion to agencies would also correct a dangerous oversimplifi cation of how best to achieve the important policies underlying the Bayh-Dole Act, by rec ognizing that patenting and exclusive licens ing are not always the best way to go.
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